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Health Care Reform, the Spending Clause,
and Dole's Restrictions
by David G. Oedel
I am here to discuss a constitutional problem with the Health Care
Reform Act" that so far has gotten little attention and that has not yet
been discussed by our other panelists. The question is whether the
federal government's expansion of Medicaid is a coercive exercise of
federal power in violation of the Spending Clause of the United States
Constitution." This is one of the two main arguments being pressed by
the twenty states87 in the Florida litigation challenging the constitutionality of health care reform." It is an argument that I think you're
likely to hear more of in the future. Although I am a deputy special
attorney general for Georgia in that case, I speak here in my personal
capacity as a constitutional law professor at Mercer University, and my
views do not necessarily reflect those of any party.
Let me begin by outlining how Medicaid is being transformed by
health care reform. Basically, eligibility for Medicaid under the Act is
being expanded by millions of people and now will reach people who are
substantially above the federally-specified poverty line." Medicare is
exclusively a federal program; Medicaid, on the other hand, is a joint
program with the states. It is the occasion for the single largest slug of
federal funding going to the states.90 It is a sum that is larger than
federal funding to the states for transportation and education combined.
Under the Health Care Reform Act, the federal funding for Medicaid
appears likely to soon be more than half of all federal funding to the
states (it had been about 40% before health care reform). In 2010

85. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
86.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8,

cl. 1.

87. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 20 States Preparefor Day
in Court Against Health Care Law, FoxNEWS.COM (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.foxnews

.com/politics/2010/09/13/states-prepare-day-court-health-care-law/.
88. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
89. Persons with incomes up to 133% of the "poverty" designation will be covered under
the changes to Medicaid beginning January 1, 2014. Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271.
90. "Medicaid is the single largest Federal grant-in-aid program to the States,
accounting for over 401%] of all Federal grants to States." H.R. 985, 109th Cong. § 2(13)
(2005), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr985ih.pdf.
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Medicaid cost the federal government about $289 billion according to the
federal government's own estimates-more than an 11% increase from
2009, and these costs were incurred even before some of the costliest
changes to Medicaid go into effect in 2014. So far health care reform
seems to have had no dampening effect on Medicaid costs. Meanwhile,
Medicaid is also a large and growing part of the typical state's own
budget. On average in 2006, even before recent increases in the costs of
Medicaid, states were spending about 17% of their own state revenues
each year to fund their share of Medicaid." Under health care reform,
Medicaid's expansion will initially be funded by the federal government,
but even if Medicaid were otherwise staying level (not growing by more
than 10% a year because of lack of cost controls in the classic system),
states will soon be spending more of their own revenues to fund 10% of
the expansion or possibly more in six years, whatever that expansion
turns out to be.
The twenty (now twenty-six) states in the Florida case are not arguing
that some reform of Medicaid is unwarranted. Rather, the argument is
about the unconstitutionally heavy-handed way the federal government
chose to force these particular changes on the states. Those states are
supposed to be partners in Medicaid, but they were basically shut out of
the reform even though their own fiscs were already being depleted by
Medicaid's runaway costs. Those fiscs are expected to be further raided
by the federal government to help fund the new expansion of Medicaid.
Let me give you some of the deep constitutional background to the
states' constitutional challenge to Medicaid. According to Article I,
section 8 of the United States Constitution, "The Congress shall have
Power [tIo . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States ... " Throughout our nation's history, this clause

has been understood to permit Congress the power only to spend for the
"general welfare" of the nation as a whole and not for the benefit of some
local state administrations to the exclusion of others. Justice Story, for

91. Georgetown University Health Policy Institute Center for Children and Families,
Medicaid and State Budgets: Looking at the Facts, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, http://ccf.
georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=ccf%20publications/about%20medicaid
/nasbo%20final%205-1-08.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2011). The Georgetown study indicates
that 16.8% of the states' general fund budgets were devoted to Medicaid in 2006 and that
Plaintiff States overall have similar characteristics, some devoting more and others less
than average. Most recent data for 2010 suggests that the present level of state spending
is 21% of state budgets overall. Peter Suderman, ObamaCare and the Medicaid Mess,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748703843004576138682854557922.html.
92. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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example, was insistent on this view of the Spending Clause in his
Commentaries."
Of course, the Spending Clause in Justice Story's day was not the
major tool of congressional expansion it has become since the advent of
the income tax by ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment 4 in 1913 and
the expansion of federal spending during the New Deal. But the basic
constitutional architecture with respect to congressional limits on
spending has been left untouched. There was little occasion for testing
the outer bounds of the Spending Clause until the New Deal, when key
new areas of federal spending were upheld-social security in Helvering
v. Davis" and unemployment insurance in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis.96
In upholding the federal spending on unemployment insurance in
Steward Machine, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the Court,
predicted that the spending power would reach its limit one day when
the federal government's coercive use of the purse would allow the
federal government to overrun the states." In his eloquent words,
Justice Cardozo called that the point at which "pressure turns into
compulsion."" The twenty states in the Florida litigation believe that
a prime case of compulsion is now squarely confronting the nation, and
the face of this compulsion is health care reform in the coercive design
of the expansion of Medicaid.
Of course, the federal government has a different view, and I would
like to summarize briefly here three of its key points while acknowledging that there is much more briefing on the subject. First, the federal
government now in court says that the states are free to opt out of the
Medicaid changes if they want, even if the statute itself makes no
mention whatever about that theoretical possibility. Second, the federal
government points out that no case of spending coercion has yet been
93. Although Story sided with Hamilton over Madison on whether Congress could
spend for some unenumerated purposes, Story simultaneously insisted that any such
purposes still must be for "general," not parochial "state administration," purposes: "Have
congress a right to raise and appropriate the public money to any, and to every purpose,
according to their will and pleasure? They certainly have not. The government of the
United States is a limited government, instituted for great national purposes, and for those
only." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 692-93
(Charles C. Little & James Brown eds., 2d ed. 1851). According to Justice Story, on whom
the defendants rely, Congress would be beyond its power "to apply money in aid of the
state administrations, for purposes strictly local . . . ." Id. at 693.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.

95. 301 U.S. 619, 644-45 (1937).
96. 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937).
97. Id. at 589-90.
98. Id. at 590.
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decided either in general or in the specific context of prior expansions of
Medicaid. Third, the federal government questions whether a coercion
case can even be justiciable because it may implicate political questions.
Most of the argument in the twenty-state litigation about Medicaid is
being framed by a case about Spending Clause limits that did reach the
Supreme Court of the United States twenty-five years ago and is
arguably the last word on the subject from the Court. That 1987 case
was South Dakota v. Dole.99 In Dole South Dakota challenged whether
the federal government could threaten to withhold 5% of highway
funding from South Dakota if it did not change its nineteen-year-old
drinking age to a twenty-one-year-old drinking age.'00 The Court held
that merely withholding 5% of an already modest allocation of highway
funding was only a form of "relatively mild encouragement" and not
coercive.'o'
In the Florida case, though, the states are facing a catastrophic 100%
loss of all federal funding for Medicaid, by far the single largest federal
transfer to the states. Dole is usually cited for a well-known dissent by
Justice O'Connor about the degree of attenuation between the purpose
of the funding and the condition that is being imposed,102 but the twenty
states are not primarily relying on that part of the opinion; rather, they
are relying on the majority's general outline of the restrictions on the
spending power. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Dole,
quoted Justice Cardozo's prediction in Steward Machine about the
possibility of persuasion turning into compulsion. ' The Court in Dole
made no mention of any justiciability problems with making such a
declaration in an appropriate case someday. Moreover, the majority in
Dole articulated four "general restrictions" on the spending power.104
The first of those general restrictions is that congressional spending
must be for the general welfare.'
Now, the Court in Dole recognized
that Congress is usually in the position of defining what is in the
general welfare. But that is not always the case. Sometimes Congress
can go off on tangents that strain credulity on the subject and can

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Id. at 205, 211.
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590) (majority opinion).

104.

Id. at 207.

105. Id. Professor Barnett and I recently wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal
that further elaborates on this argument. Randy E. Barnett & David G. Oedel, Op-Ed.,
ObamaCareand the General Welfare Clause, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2010, http://online.wsj

.com/article/SB10001424052748703581204576033862848034544.html.
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become "arbitrary" in the words of Justice Cardozo.o' It is not enough
to say that the 1936 case of United States v. Butler,o' in which the
Supreme Court held that the spending power reaches subjects not
otherwise in the enumerated powers of Congress, justifies substantially
problematic conceptions by Congress of the general welfare. 18 Here is
how Justice Cardozo described the problem:
[DIifficulties are left when [a broader conception of the spending] power
is conceded. The line must still be drawn between one welfare and
another, between particular and general. Where this shall be placed
cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. There is
a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at
large.109
Let me go forward from Justice Cardozo's time to last year and the
Cornhusker Kickback.' 10 It was the unique deal offered to Nebraska if
one of its senators would sign on to health care reform."'1 Every other
state would eventually have to pay some unspecified additional amount
for Medicaid's changes, but Nebraska would get every dime of its
increased costs paid.'12 There was outrage around the country about this
provision, and it was eventually junked, but it is the kind of facially
arbitrary provision that one could argue is unconstitutional because it
is not within the "general" welfare. While all states were to get basically
the same program, one state would have gotten a free ride when all
others would have paid."' This is the kind of thing that Justice Story
was talking about when he said that peculiar local benefits given to
particular state administrations are not within the general welfare."'
And Justice Story's views are especially important on this point because
he was also the authority that the Supreme Court relied on in Butler: in
that case, Justice Story helped resolve the separate controversy between

106.
107.
108.

Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Id. at 85, 88.

109. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
110.
111.

See infra note 113.
Robert Pear, Deep in Health Bill, Very Specific Beneficiaries,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21,

2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/2l/health/policy/21health care.html.
112. Id.
113. In his final State-of-the-State address, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
got his biggest applause after mentioning Nebraska's sweetheart deal in the proposed
expansion of Medicaid, then saying that Senator Nelson "'got the corn; we got the husk.'"
Steve Yeater, Schwarzenegger: CaliforniaNeeds a 'SweetheartDeal,' Too, PRESCRIPTIONS:

THE BUSINESS OF HEALTH CARE, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 6, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://prescrip
tions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/schwarzenegger-california-needs-a-sweetheart-deal-too/.
114. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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Hamilton and Madison about whether the spending power could be used
to effect purposes outside the enumerated powers."'
Furthermore, health care reform is more plainly justiciable because
what passed was a sophisticated system of coercion that threatened to
allow a majority of states to exploit any stray minority state and its
citizens. That is different from the Cornhusker situation, in which a
minority extracted something from the majority. To understand the
coercive elegance of the final scheme of recent health care reform, note
to begin with that every single state is already completely committed to
Medicaid. This situation is unlike that in Dole, in which there were
many states with different drinking ages, including the complaining
state of South Dakota. To the contrary, in 2010 we already had 100%
uniformity with respect to Medicaid prior to the passage of health care
reform. Now recall that the federal government's first-line defense
against the alleged coerciveness of the changes to Medicaid is that the
states are supposedly perfectly free to opt out. However, if a state were
to opt out, all the federal funding-more than $5 billion for a median
state-would completely disappear. Such a state would be unable to pay
for its own poorer citizens' health care. Meanwhile, the funds of the U.S.
taxpayers within the dissenting state would be used only to fund the
poorer citizens of other states.
The coercive implications of this scheme are so obvious that even the
New York Times admitted in an editorial that it would not be "practical"
for any state to opt out of the changes to Medicaid."' Indeed, though we
have twenty-plus states kicking and screaming about their objections to
health care reform, not a single state has opted out. However, if any
state did opt out, that action would reveal the unconstitutionality of the
Act as being against the general welfare. In short, the all-in-or-all-out
feature of Medicaid reform is really nothing more than a strong-arm
tactic that effectively coerces every state to assent to the changes
whether the state likes them or not.
Could the expansion of Medicaid have been structured constitutionally? Of course it could have: states wanting to opt out of the changes to
Medicaid could have been given block grants for them to spend for the
poor's health as they saw fit. We already have a system for rough
justice in dividing Medicaid funding fairly among all fifty states, despite
some differences in state incomes, under an elaborate calculus called the

115. 297 U.S. at 66.
116. "It is true, as the suit contends, that it may not be practical for states to drop out
of a Medicaid program that serves many of their poorest residents." Editorial, The Legal
Assault on Health Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03
/29/opinion/29monl.html?pagewanted=print.
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Federal Medical Assistance Percentage formula. But Congress did not
want to give the states the chance to get their same rough share of
Medicaid funding, because Congress knew perfectly well that many
states would exercise the opportunity to design their own approaches to
health care reform-approaches that would not continue Medicaid's
currently unbridled cost inflation and would not expand the classes of
those entitled to use the most ill-conceived parts of the health care
system.
As an aside, let me give you just one example of the federal government's folly when it comes to Medicaid design-just one reason why it
makes sense for states to resist expansion of Medicaid as both inhumane
and inefficient. The Journal of the American Medical Association
provides that it makes sense for people with HIV to get on the AIDS
cocktail when their t-counts dip below 350. However, Medicaid makes
them wait until their t-counts drop to 200, when full-blown AIDS is
already there or near, and catastrophic expenses that could have been
avoided are then incurred.
Let us get back to Dole and why its second so-called "general
restriction" on the spending power is being violated by health care
reform. Coming out of the Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman"' case, which was specifically cited in Dole,"' the second
general restriction is whether a state can clearly identify its options with
respect to any condition the federal government wants to encourage
through its spending-in other words, this restriction is about whether
any conditions imposed on the states by the federal government are
clearly and unambiguously articulated." You might have thought that

117. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
118. 483 U.S. at 207.
119. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17-18.
[Liegislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the "contract." There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.
Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal
moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a
clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
the consequences of their participation.
Indeed, in those instances where Congress has intended the States to fund
certain entitlements as a condition of receiving federal funds, it has proved
capable of saying so explicitly.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct.
2484, 2495 (2009); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516,
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in the thousands of pages of text of health care reform, there would be
some mention of what would happen to a state if it were to opt out of the
changes to Medicaid. But I can assure you, as I am apparently one of
the few people who actually read the Act, that there is simply no
mention whatsoever of any possibility of opting out of Medicaid or what
opting out might mean. Only in court does the federal government now
say that a state can opt out (even if it would lose the single largest form
of federal funding to the state and its citizens). Of course, it is
completely pretextual to say that a state can opt out. Each state's
acceptance is practically mandatory. But if we do credit the federal
government's argument that any state's choice to buy into the changes
to Medicaid is really a choice, then that choice can only be made
knowingly if states can understand the alternative by reading the Act.
And that is not currently possible.
Another of the general restrictions of Dole is whether other constitutional violations are implicated by the scheme of spending.12 0 In Dole
there was no question of general welfare or the clarity of the choice
between an inconsistent drinking age and 5% of highway funding, and
the Court also concluded that a twenty-one-year-old drinking age
12
presented no other constitutional affront to anyone. 1
But health care reform is a very different situation. If a state were to
opt out of Medicaid, as the federal government insists that the states
have a right to do under the Act, the citizens of that state would thereby
be deprived of federal funding for health care within their state simply
because of the happenstance of their state citizenship. This kind of
discrimination against individual U.S. citizens merely because of their
state citizenship would violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'22 There
are constitutional affronts, too, to the Ninth Amendmentl2 3 and Tenth
Amendment,'24 as well as to the Guaranty Clause125-D interesting
suggestion made by the Supreme Court in the case of New York v.

United States.12

534 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006);
Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditionson Spending, UnclearImplications for States
in FederalHealth care Programs,86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 453-56 (2008).

120. 483 U.S. at 208, 210.
121. Id. at 211.
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,

123.
124.
125.
126.
address

§ 1, cl. 2, 4.
Id. at amend. IX.
Id. at amend. X.
Id. at art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (expressing sympathy with the view that "courts should
the merits of [Guaranty Clausel claims" in the context of Tenth Amendment
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Let me close with these simple observations. Back in the 1930s, when
the limits on the Spending Clause were first sketched out by Justice
Cardozo and his colleagues, no states were challenging the spending, and
the general welfare was not disputed. Today, however, many states
object and yet must still capitulate because they are being coerced by the
threat that if they do not capitulate, the general welfare and the rights
of their own citizens will be damaged to the point that their poorest
citizens will die from lack of health care. The states simply have no
choice but to assent to a plan that continues to harm their states in very
serious ways, forcing them to choose to continue funding a runaway
Medicaid system at ever-increasing costs to the states while teachers and
police are being laid off. The states' hard budgetary choices in this era
are being made in substantial part by the federal government, not by the
state legislatures. And the federal government is telling the states to
keep spending more and more of their own money on a wildly inefficient
system of Medicaid.
This is a prima facie case of coercion and a Tenth Amendment
violation. I respectfully suggest that it would be appropriate for courts
to adjudicate disputes regarding the constitutionality of health care
reform under the authority of McCulloch v. Maryland,' thus vindicating the principle of representation reinforcement suggested in McCulloch
and refined by Professors Bickel and Ely.'2 8 These states and their
citizens have been pressed upon perniciously by the federal government
in an elaborately unconstitutional scheme. I have nothing personal
against heathcare reform in theory or President Obama as a politician.
I even voted for President Obama. However, this is a situation that
transcends partisanship and is a critical constitutional moment for our
nation, and our courts must intervene for reasons that go far beyond
health care.

concerns).
127. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Even in that case, which is famed for stating a strong form
of congressional power, Chief Justice Marshall was careful to note the difference between
the exercise of congressional power for national rather than state-specific purposes, and he
also warned that the judiciary must step in for representation reinforcement to rescue
states from the threat of being treated differentially by the national government: "[T]he
government of the Union . . . is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it
represents all, and acts for all," wrote the Great Chief. "Though any one state may be
willing to control [the national government's] operations, no state is willing to allow others
to control them." Id. at 405.
128. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962)
(judiciary as counter-majoritarian force); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87-88 (1980) (explaining the critical judicial role in

representation reinforcement).
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Thank you for this opportunity to sketch out why there may be more
to the constitutional challenges to health care reform than may at first
meet the eye.

(continued on next page)

